










Making World Heritage Truly Global: 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2745 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Making World Heritage Truly Global: 





Culture has attributes of a global public good that needs to be preserved for mankind as a 
whole. World Culture Certificates are proposed to efficiently preserve World Heritage. The 
community of nations has to agree on the Global Heritage List and how much each nation is 
to contribute to that purpose. Each World Heritage site conserved is acknowledged through 
the issuance of a tradable Certificate. Countries and private firms are induced to seek sites 
where financial resources can be spent most productively. This leads to an efficient allocation 
of resources to preserve World Heritage. 
JEL Code: Z11, D60, F50, H87. 






Bruno S. Frey 
University of Zurich 








Switzerland - Zurich 
pamini@ior.uzh.ch 
   
 
 
Revised version 27 May 2009 
We are grateful to Isabel Ellenberger for checking the text and an anonymous referee for 
excellent suggestions for improvement. We thank Christine Benesch, Francoise Benhamou, 
Reiner Eichenberger, Susanne Neckermann, Sir Alan Peacock, David Throsby and Clement 
Tisdell for helpful comments. 3
I. World Heritage and Conservation Needs
The UNESCO Convention on World Heritage of 1972 “seeks to encourage the
identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the
world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity”
1.  It aims to preserve
monuments, natural and cultural landscapes as a legacy of the past, in order to pass
this heritage on to future generations. From its very beginning the convention’s
intention has been directed towards the entire world. World Heritage is a clear
example of a global common good: “The World Heritage List reflects the wealth and
diversity of the Earth’s cultural and natural heritage” (UNESCO 2005: 4). The
convention goes far beyond established national conservation efforts because it
acknowledges that due to the free-rider problem associated with managing
preservation on a purely national level the aggregate quantity of preservation is
inefficiently low. A host country will pay only to preserve up to the point where the
marginal national benefit equal marginal cost.
                                                   
1 Mission Statement, World Heritage Information Kit, UNESCO (2005: 1). It must be
emphasized that UNESCO does not provide any (or at best only minor) financial help;
UNESCO provides  expertise and scientific support.4
The World Heritage movement started in 1959 with the international campaign
launched by UNESCO to save the Abu Simbel temples in the Nile valley
2. At the
beginning, World Heritage was directed to cultural sites but since 1968 is also
includes natural sites, and since 1992 also stresses significant interactions between
people and the natural environment, entitled “cultural landscapes”(UNESCO
2005:10).
This noble ideal has only been attained to a limited extent. In particular, the
distribution of effort and expenditure to preserve World Heritage is inefficient. A
striking fact is that in some countries a large number of most valuable heritage sites
can be found that are in extremely dilapidated condition and are in urgent need of
restoration but the funds to restore the sites are lacking. At the same time other
                                                   
2 It might be argued that the great attention paid to the seven “Classical World
Wonders” (Great Pyramid of Giza, Hanging Gardens of Babylon, Statue of Zeus at
Olympia, Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, Mausoleum of Maussolos at Halicarnassus,
Colossus of Rhodes and the Lighthouse of Alexandria) were precursors. In 2007, an
internet vote with allegedly 100 million participants (www.new7wonders.com)
determined the “New Seven Wonders of the World”(the Great Wall of China, Christ
the Redeemer on the Corcovado in Rio de Janeiro; Machu Picchu in Peru, Chichen
Itza in Mexico, Petra in Jordan, the Taj Mahal in India, and the Coliseum in Rome.
Other finalists were, among others, the Acropolis in Athens, the Alhambra, Angkor
Wat, Eiffel Tower, Hagia Sophia, Neuschwanstein Castle, Statue of Liberty,
Stonehenge, and the Sydney Opera House (http:// wikipedia.org/New Seven Wonders
of the World, accessed 26 August 2008). Many other organizations care for cultural
heritage beyond national boundaries, an example being Europa Nostra, a European-
wide movement presided by the prince consort of Denmark.5
countries spend a lot of resources on saving and beautifully restoring heritage sites
that - in comparison - are in much less need. To give an example: In Cuba, especially
in Havana, many beautiful buildings are virtually crumbling and falling apart while
developed economies such as France, Germany, Austria or Switzerland spend large
sums on restoring monuments of lesser importance to world heritage. The point made
here is most certainly not that the funds are wasted but rather that the same amount of
money could contribute much more if used for the preservation of heritage sites in
some other countries. In other words: some poor countries spend too little “per unit”
of world heritage saved while rich countries spend too much. From a global point of
view, the situation, therefore, is clearly suboptimal and ways to improve this situation
should be thought of.
This paper envisions a solution to this imbalance by using and applying resources and
it discusses the advantages and problems that could arise
3. In line with UNESCO, our
                                                   
3 To my knowledge, this is the first such policy proposal based on economic
principles. A comprehensive analysis of heritage issues is provided in Peacock and
Rizzo (2008). Other economic analyses devoted to World Heritage mainly evaluate
the utility of preserving the past as well as financial consequences. See, for instance,
Benhamou 1996, 2003, Frey 1997, Greffe 1999, Klamer and Throsby 2000, Mossetto
1994, Mossetto and Vecco 2001, Netzer 1998, Peacock 1978, 1995, Rizzo 2006,
Streeten 2006, Throsby 1997a, 1997b, 2003. See also the collection of articles in
Hutter and Rizzo 1997, Peacock 1998, Rizzo and Towse 2002, van der Aa 2005 and
the more general monographs and collections by Frey 2003, Ginsburgh 2004,
Ginsburgh and Throsby 2006, Towse 1997, 2003 and Throsby 2001. The
consequences of being listed, in particular on the number of visitors frequenting these
sites are studied e.g. in Bonet 2003 or Tisdell and Wilson 2002.6
proposal focuses on those parts of heritage, which are considered to belong to
humanity. This concept that regards cultural heritage as a global public good is
normative in the sense that it is not necessarily perceived as such by the public,
interest groups or the government (see below). The proposal advanced here, thus
follows the intention of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, and seeks a way to
achieve its goal of preservation as efficiently as possible. There are many cultural
heritage sites that combine both public and private good attributes. We are not
concerned here with the many cases of local cultural public goods.
The proposal advanced here, is informed by programs designed to solve the global
environmental problems, such as climate change (see e.g. Tietenberg 2006, Stern
2007, Antes et al. 2008): Incentives are provided to overcome the common pool
problem of reducing externalities by coordinating action.
Another analogy is NATO
4 whose goal is to promote the collective defense of its
member states. “Indicators of responsibility” have been devised to assess the relative
burdens falling to the individual member states.
II. Outline of the Proposal
The goal of the World Heritage movement should be the preservation of World
Heritage sites to the largest possible extent by spending as few resources as possible.
Restrictions pertaining to a minimum amount of resources spent are crucial and
correspond to the very foundation of economics. Resources are limited; and this
applies in particular to the resources spent on cultural preservation. The problem
outlined here, that some (poor) countries spend very little on preserving their heritage
could be easily solved by compelling the richer countries to pick up the bill. However,
                                                   
4 I owe this point to Sir Alan Peacock.7
this remains wishful thinking. It certainly cannot be a lack of information that
prevents a flow of resources to the restoration of the monuments in dire need of
preservation. To come back to the example above: everyone knows about the terrible
state of repair of the culturally most valuable buildings in Havana but for many
different reasons the flow of money does not take place. To be put on the List of
World Heritage
5 does not lead to any significant support by UNESCO. Indeed,
according to the official “World Heritage Information Kit” (March 2005: 11) “The
World Heritage Fund receives a total amount each year of just under US$ 4 million”
which is minimal compared to the existing needs.
A viable proposal must therefore presuppose a limited amount of resources devoted to
the preservation of cultural heritage. The effort must lie in the distribution of the
resources available in such a way that the world heritage is globally improved as
comprehensively as possible.
                                                   
5 Two Advisory Bodies, the International Council on Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS), for cultural sites and the World Conservation Unit (IUCN), for natural
sites, do evaluations after a process of careful consideration of ten selection criteria.
This paper does not criticize the choices made, though they are (as any such list)
debatable (it is, for instance, unclear why Heidelberg in Germany and Stein am Rhein
in Switzerland are not on the List). Nor is it taken for granted that inclusion in the List
guarantees protection, as there may be adverse effects such as the overuse through
increased visits by tourists (Machu Picchu being an example, see the Economist
2007:60), the redirection of funds to the disadvantage of other heritage sites, or the
increased danger that such sites are explicitly sought out as targets in wars (such as
e.g. Dubrovnik during the last Balkan war, see UNESCO 2005:16). Some of these
aspects are discussed in Frey and Pamini 2008.8
The proposal consists in four steps: (1) Determining what belongs to World Heritage;
(2) Agreeing on the financial obligations of individual countries; (3) Assigning
Heritage Certificates; (4) Trading World Heritage Certificates.
1. Determining What Belongs to World Heritage
The world community, i.e. the member states of the United Nations, has to agree on
what they consider “World Heritage” worth protecting and conserving. UNESCO has
done so in its World Heritage List. The authors are well aware that this List is the
result of many compromises, and that it is also subject to political pressures and
manipulations (for an econometric study see Frey and Pamini 2008). There are a great
many open issues as to which objects of cultural heritage should be included (for
instance, should it include all man-made artifacts worthy of preservation for future
generations, including moveable works of art such as masterpiece paintings, or should
it include only immoveable heritage objects). Here, the definition implicit in the
World Heritage List has been taken as the starting point.
As of August 2008, there were 878 properties on this list, containing 679 cultural, 174
natural and 25 mixed sites in 145 countries of the world. The List is continually
expanded in particular because so far no site has ever been removed
6. The list contains
very different properties, even if one only considers its main emphasis, cultural
heritage
7. The sites range from entire cities (such as Trinidad in Cuba, Quedlinburg in
                                                   
6 The expansion covers ever-new areas. According to a press report (Neue Zuercher
Zeitung 2008), French president Sarkozy promised to lobby for the French cuisine to
become part of World Heritage.
7 For an analysis of natural heritage sites see e.g. Tisdell and Wilson 2002 or Driml
2002.9
Germany, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius in the three Baltic States or Dubrovnik in
Croatia) to individual buildings (such as the Acropolis in Athens, the Tower of
London, the Taj Mahal or the Abbey in Lorsch, Germany).
For our proposal it is necessary that the items on the list can be compared. The experts
compiling the list must indicate how many “World Heritage Units” (WHU) are
involved in each site. This requires a comparison between individual aspects of
various sites. The WHU must refer to the fundamental cultural importance of a site
rather than to the extent of its present state of conservation. To establish such a list of
World Heritage Units is certainly no easy task.  The two Advisory Boards (ICOMOS
and IUCN) that are compiling the List of World Heritage Sites are already implicitly
assigning such criteria when they state how many of the ten selection criteria apply to
what extent, and therefore how important it is to preserve a particular site. If a
heritage site is in danger of disintegrating completely unless preservation efforts are
undertaken, it is assigned more WHUs than a site that is in no immediate danger of
irreversible damage. If an entire city with a considerable number of buildings is to be
preserved, more WHUs are involved than if only a particular small building is to be
preserved. If a heritage sight can be preserved for the time being by a small
intervention, less WHUs are assigned than if only a large intervention could save the
site.
WHU may be looked at as a “shopping list” indicating, for instance, that the urgent
restoration of a particular building in Havana corresponds to 5 WH-units, while the
general maintenance of Machu Picchu corresponds to 3 WH-units. The units
correspond to the loss of global heritage if the specified project were not carried out
within a given year.10
The assignment of World Heritage Units to all the sites deemed worth preserving by
the experts is a necessary first step in order to make World Heritage truly global.
          2. Agreeing on the Obligations of Individual Countries
The world community has to agree about how many World Heritage Sites are to be
preserved as well as on the needed contribution of each country to protect and sustain
the World Heritage. The allocation of the burden is to be made in terms of World
Heritage Units in order to make it comparable. Each country must be willing to
contribute some share to preserve the World Heritage in terms of World Heritage
Units. The individual countries are forced to be specific rather than to agree in general
terms that the preservation of World Heritage is “important”. Equal shares of the
burden for each country would certainly be considered unfair as such an arrangement
does not take into account the geographical size of a country, the size of its
population, and in particular its per capita income level or wealth. As there is no
world government, a consensus among the member states must be reached. Such a
consensus about what is to be put on the World Heritage List and about the share to
be carried by each country is likely to be reached only if the ability to pay, or the per
capita income level of a country, as well as its size, is given due weight.
As has been the case with other world problems, such as the preservation of world
peace or the natural environment, a consensus is not easily reached, and may even fail
completely to be reached. The most likely outcome therefore will be that a few
countries will carry most of the financial burden, as is the case with the general UN-
budget which is overwhelmingly financed by the United States, Japan and the large
European countries. The countries supposed to contribute the largest share of the11
World Heritage Units are unlikely to do so unless they are compensated by a larger
say in the decision making process. This is analogous to the main contributors to the
general UN-budget being permanent members of the Security Council where they
have a larger say with respect to the decisions taken. In the case of cultural heritage, a
corresponding “World Heritage Board” can be established where the main financial
contributors have permanent seats while the main beneficiaries rotate to share the
temporary seats.
3.  Assigning World Heritage Certificates
Each World Heritage Unit protected is attributed a “World Heritage Certificate”.
Each certificate corresponds to one unit of a World Heritage saved. Whoever spends
resources on the preservation of world heritage properties receives a number of
certificates corresponding to the number of World Heritage Units preserved.
Cultural experts have to determine the extent to which a certain preservation activity
contributes indeed to safeguarding World Heritage Units. If, for example, a
preservation activity is done superficially, in an incompetent or even damaging way,
no certificate is assigned. The UNESCO World Heritage Fund and the two Advisory
Boards ICOMOS and IUCN are an obvious choice to administer this program.
In order to appreciate how the scheme works, it is useful to consider specific
situations. In the following, three cases will be discussed.
Case A. Consider the extreme case of a country that does not have any recognized
World Heritage sites but which agrees (in step 2) to contribute a particular number of
Units to the preservation of World Heritage. This obligation can be met by financing12
the preservation of World Heritage Units abroad, and to therewith acquire World
Heritage Certificates. The country has an incentive to search for World Heritage sites,
which offer the highest possible number of World Heritage Certificates in return for
the funds pledged. The suppliers of funds have an incentive to seek and support those
World Heritage Sites most in need of preservation.
The country committing funds therewith acquires a number of Heritage Certificates
documenting the fact that it has contributed to this extent to the preservation of World
Heritage. If the country accumulates sufficient Heritage Certificates to meet its
obligations it has acted as a good member of the global community. At the same time
it has helped to efficiently secure the preservation of World Heritage.
Case B. Consider now the opposite extreme case, a country with a larger number of
World Heritage Units to be preserved within its borders but with only limited or no
financial means for this purpose. Such a country has an incentive to attract donors to
save its sites by offering attractive opportunities to do so. It makes an effort to
preserve its World Heritage Units at the lowest cost possible so that the corresponding
certificates have a low price. The cheaper the price of the certificate, the more
Heritage Certificates potential donors would receive for a given sum of money. The
(potential) recipient country is motivated to become active and to make
internationally known what sites it has, and what the financial requirements are for
preserving them. The applicants for funds have an incentive to become active and to
therefore provide the most efficient preservation of World Heritage Sites.
Case C. A country has agreed to preserve within its borders a given number of World
Heritage Units in step 2. However, cultural experts have classified these sites to be of13
(relatively) little importance. To save national cultural sites provides few Heritage
Certificates in contrast to preserving Heritage sites abroad. The decision makers in
this country are confronted with a trade-off. They can spend the money designated for
cultural preservation for national sites, in which case they accumulate only a few
World Heritage Certificates. Alternatively, they can spend the funds to preserve
foreign World Heritage Sites that offer cheaper certificates, thus they can more easily
fulfill their international obligations. In most cases, a mixed solution will be the best:
some money will be spent on domestic sites for which a unit of money has most effect
on preservation (i.e. where the Certificates are relatively cheap) but it would be a
waste of money to keep spending on domestic sites when much cheaper World
Heritage Certificates may be acquired by spending the money on foreign sites with
much greater effect (and therefore cheap certificates per unit of money). The scheme
thus takes into account the marginal productivities of spending money on preserving
sites and gives financial incentives to individual countries to spend money, designated
for preservation, where it is most needed according to the evaluation of the cultural
experts.
4.  Trading World Heritage Certificates
So far only monetary contributions to the preservation of World Heritage sites were
considered. Opening up a market in which to trade the certificates increases the
probability that such sites will be preserved, especially in developing countries. Poor
countries may acquire World Heritage Certificates by specializing in preserving
World Heritage sites. The preservation of cultural and natural heritage sites is a labor-14
intensive activity
8 in which poor countries with much hidden or open unemployment
have a relative advantage. Such a country may engage in a program with the goal of
saving the maximum possible number of World Heritage Units within its borders.
They thereby acquire World Heritage Certificates, which they can sell to countries
that have less productive possibilities to preserve World Heritage. A developing
country may sell its services to produce World Heritage Units at a favorable price in
any country enabling it to acquire Certificates. If the number exceeds the sum agreed
on in step 2, they can sell the surplus on the open market.
Moreover, for-profit firms may become active and offer to undertake the preservation
of specific World Heritage sites. They will be compensated through the certificates
acquired, which they can sell in the market. This opens a new area of activity for
private enterprise even in cases in which heritage is a public good, i.e. where the
benefits of its existence cannot be privately exploited
9. The scheme also establishes
competition between public actors, which so far have had a monopolistic situation in
most countries and areas of public heritage preservation.
On the demand side, Heritage Certificates enable private organizations, in particular
NGOs devoted to the preservation of culture, to directly participate in saving
disregarded World Heritage sites rather than having to rely on political lobbying with
uncertain outcomes. They can acquire as many certificates as they choose which tends
                                                   
8 But expert guidance is also needed so that the preservation activity leads to World
Heritage Certificates. This can be achieved by hiring foreign experts, and to train the
work force to do the preservation work according to the standards set.
9 Private activities have, of course, played a major role to preserve cultural heritage in
cases in which the benefits of the sites could be privately exploited, especially for
tourism.15
to raise their price and provides an incentive to governments and private firms to
undertake additional preservation efforts.
Tradeable World Heritage Certificates have the advantage of producing generally
accessible knowledge about which sites should be preserved; they profit from the
Hayekian process of generating information through markets.
III. Political Feasibility
A few years ago a scheme as the one that has been suggested here, based on tradable
international certificates, would have been considered outlandish. But circumstances
have changed, mainly due to the successful introduction of such schemes as the ones
for environmental protection
10. The goal is the same: to achieve maximum effect
globally with the lowest cost of resources. The certificate system proposed here is in
one respect more feasible than some of the tradable environmental schemes because
the number of World Heritage sites is very large and so trading is not hampered by a
low number of traders and monopolistic distortions (see e.g. Ellerman and Buchner
2007). As environmental certificates have slowly started to be appreciated by
politicians and the public, it could be expected that a similar scheme for cultural
preservation would also be acceptable.
Nevertheless, much opposition is to be expected. In most countries, “culture” is still
considered a “national affair”. Many people are convinced that each country should,
first and foremost, care for its own cultural sites. As the funds for these preservation
activities are normally quite limited, this means in effect that all is spent on national
sites but possibly with strongly decreasing marginal returns. Only on special
                                                   
10 See e.g. Insley 2003, Tietenberg 2006, Antes et al. 2008, Krysiak 2008.16
occasions when a spectacular cultural monument in a foreign country is to be saved
(such as the Abu Simbel temple), a country’s decision makers are prepared to spend
money for that purpose abroad. The argument that the issue serves not the
preservation of national culture but the culture of humankind as a whole probably
carries little weight in environments fixated on national issues.
Our proposal for World Culture Certificates may be opposed because the sites
selected are treated as merit goods whose value are determined by a set of experts
chosen by UNESCO. However, the culture certificate scheme proposed here does not
depend on who determines the list; it could also be achieved through a democratic
process. Our proposal serves to achieve an efficient use of resources to protect the
international public good of World Heritage, however this term is defined.
Interest groups concerned with preserving culture will strongly oppose the
globalization underlying the proposed scheme, as they are – at least up to the present
– almost entirely organized nationally.  Seen from that point of view, to globally
maximize the extent of cultural preservation, achieved through a given sum of money
could be considered to betray a country’s interests.
However, not all organized groups that are politically powerful will oppose the
Heritage Certificate scheme. The more people travel abroad and visit foreign cultural
monuments the more interested will be the firms engaged in international tourism that
the respective cultural monuments are well preserved. They will welcome such a
scheme
11. More generally, globalization cannot be stopped and it can be expected that
more and more persons embrace points of view that go beyond the sole interests of
                                                   
11 But the national tourist boards will oppose it because they benefit from the money
being spent for monuments in their own country and region.17
their own nation. The preservation of the culture of humankind is likely to become
increasingly appreciated.
IV. Conclusions
The World Culture Certificates proposed here intend to maximize the effect of the
financial resources spent on the preservation of World Heritage sites. At present,
some (rich) countries spend a lot of money on the preservation of cultural monuments
that are of only secondary importance while at the same time in other (poor) countries
highly valuable cultural monuments fall into ruins for lack of money. In regard to the
preservation of humankind’s cultural goods, this is a waste of resources. The World
Culture Certificate scheme induces nations to spend the money where it produces the
greatest effect on preserving world heritage. The community of nations, as embodied
by the United Nations, has to establish how many World Heritage Units each nation is
prepared to save. Each World Heritage Unit saved anywhere in the world is
acknowledged by a certificate. The cost of a certificate is the lower the less expensive
it is to accomplish saving a World Heritage Site. It is, therefore, advantageous to
countries not to only concentrate on saving their national heritage (which may be very
expensive due to decreasing returns) but also to seek sites where funds can be
expended most productively and therewith the World Heritage Certificates can be
acquired most inexpensively. This leads to an efficient allocation of resources from a
global point of view. Poor countries with only very limited available funds to protect
their cultural heritage can commit to protecting their monuments and to therewith
acquire certificates they will be able to sell in the market. As the preservation of
cultural monuments is a labor-intensive activity, the certificate scheme offers a new18
way for poor countries to develop economically, and at the same time allows them to
preserve their cultural heritage.
A major advantage of World Heritage Certificates is that actors interested in
preserving the “earth’s cultural and natural heritage” can do so directly, effectively
and in a sustainable manner. Under present conditions the preservation of the global
cultural heritage often depends on political uncertainties: sometimes the international
community can be mobilized to rescue a particular site (as was the case for Abu
Simbel) but in many cases such mobilization is ineffective or comes late. Moreover,
private firms may engage in saving World Heritage sites by acquiring certificates
whose contribution to preserving World Heritage has been approved by experts.
The proposal of World Culture Certificates advanced here is certainly only one
possibility to protect the global heritage of culture. It needs to be considered and
examined in contrast to other attempts (which are, however, sadly lacking) to reach
the same goal. Many arguments against the propagated scheme are possible. An
important one is that the organization in charge, UNESCO, suffers from all the
problems Public Choice theory associates with large bureaucracies (see, in general,
Mueller 2003, and for the case of heritage Peacock and Rizzo 2008). The authors fully
appreciate these concerns (see e.g. Frey 1983, 2001) but nevertheless think that it is
worthwhile to suggest a proposal to save World Heritage in danger of destruction.
References
Antes, Ralf; Bernd Hansjürgens and Peter Letmathe (2008). Emissions Trading.
Institutional Design, Decision Making and Corporate Strategies. New York,
Springer.19
Benhamou, Françoise (1996). Is Increased Public Spending for the Preservation of
Historic Monuments Inevitable? The French Case. Journal of Cultural
Economics 20: 115-131.
Benhamou, Françoise (2003). Heritage. In: Ruth Towse (ed.). A Handbook of Cultural
Economics. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 255-
262.
Benhamou, Françoise (2004). Who Owns Cultural Goods? The Case of Built
Heritage. In: Victor A. Ginsburgh (ed.). Economics of Art and Culture.
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 187-202.
Bonet, Lluis (2003). Cultural tourism. In: Ruth Towse (ed.). A Handbook of Cultural
Economics. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 187-
193.
Driml, Sally (2002). Travel Cost Analysis of Recreation Value in the Wet Tropics
World Heritage Area. Economic Analysis and Policy 32: 11-26
Economist (2007). Wonders of the world. Reluctant marvels. June 30
th, p. 60.
Ellerman, A. Denny and Barbara K. Buchner (2007). The European Union Emission
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation and Early Results. Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 1: 66-87.
Frey, Bruno S. (1983). Democratic Economic Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frey, Bruno S. (1997). The Evaluation of Cultural Heritage. Some Critical Issues. In:
Michael Hutter and Ilde Rizzo (eds.). Economic Perspectives on Cultural
Heritage. London: Macmillan.
Frey, Bruno S. (2001). Inspiring Economics. Human Motivation in Political
Economy. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.20
Frey, Bruno S. (2003). Arts and Economics. Analysis and Cultural Policy. Berlin,
Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2
nd ed.
Frey, Bruno S. and Paolo Pamini (2008). What Is on the World Heritage List? An
Econometric Analysis. Mimeo, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,
University of Zurich.
Ginsburgh, Victor A. (ed.) (2004). Economics of Art and Culture. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Ginsburgh, Victor A. and David Throsby (eds.) (2006). Handbook of the Economics
of Art and Culture. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Greffe, Xavier (1999). La gestion du patrimoine culturel. Paris: Anthropos.
Hutter, Michael and Ilde Rizzo (eds.) (1997). Economic Perspectives on Cultural
Heritage. London: Macmillan.
Insley, Margaret (2003). On the Options to Invest in Pollution Control under a
Regime of Tradable Emission Allowances. Canadian Journal of Economics 36:
860-883.
Klamer, Arjo and David Throsby (2000). Paying for the Past: the Economics of
Cultural Heritage. World Culture Report. New York: UNESCO. 130-145.
Krysiak, Frank (2008). Ex-post Efficient Permit Markets: A Detailed Analysis.
Environmental and Resource Economics 39(4): 397-410.
Mossetto, Gianfranco (1994). The Economic Dilemma of Heritage Preservation. In:
Alan Peacock and Ilde Rizzo (eds). Cultural Economics and Cultural Policies.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Mossetto, Gianfranco and Marilena Vecco (2001). Economia del patrimonio
monumentale. Venice: F. Angeli.
Mueller, Dennis (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.21
Netzer, Dick (1998). International Aspects of Heritage Policies. In: Alan Peacock
(ed.) Does the Past Have a Future? The Political Economy of Heritage. London:
Institute of Economic Affairs. 135-154.
Neue Zuercher Zeitung (2008). Franzoesische Kueche als Weltkulturerbe. NZZ
Online, 23 February.
Peacock, Alan (1978). Preserving the past: an international economic dilemma.
Journal of Cultural Economics 2: 1-11.
Peacock, Alan (1995). A Future for the Past: The Political Economy of Heritage.
Keynes Lecture in Economics. Proceedings of the British Academy 87: 189-243.
Reprinted in Ruth Towse (ed.) (1997). Cultural Economics: the Arts, Heritage
and the Media Industries. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 387-424.
Peacock, Alan (ed.) (1998). Does the Past Have a Future? The Political Economy of
Heritage. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 135-154.
Peacock, Alan (2004). The Credibility of Cultural Economists’ Advice to
Governments. In: Victor A. Ginsburgh (ed.). Economics of Art and Culture.
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 165-186.
Peacock, Alan and Ilde Rizzo (2008). The Heritage Game. Economics, Politics, and
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rizzo, Ilde and Ruth Towse (eds.) (2002). The Economics of Heritage. Cheltenham,
UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Rizzo, Ilde (2006). Cultural Heritage: Economic Analysis and Public Policy. In:
Victor A. Ginsburgh and David Throsby (eds.). Handbook of the Economics of
Art and Culture. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 983-1016.
Stern, Nicholas (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge22
Streeten, Paul (2006). Culture and Economic Development. In: Victor A. Ginsburgh
and David Throsby (eds.). Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture. Vol.
1. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 399-412.
Throsby, David (1997a). Sustainability and culture: some theoretical issues.
International Journal of Cultural Policy 4: 7-20.
Throsby, David (1997b). Seven Questions in the Economics of Cultural Heritage. In:
Michael Hutter and Ilde Rizzo (eds.). Economic Perspectives on Cultural
Heritage. London: Macmillan. 13-30.
Throsby, David (2001). Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Throsby, David (2003). Cultural sustainability. In: Ruth Towse (ed.). A Handbook of
Cultural Economics. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward
Elgar. 183-186.
Tietenberg, Thomas H. (2006). Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice. RFF
Press: Washington DC.
Tisdell, Clement and Clevo Wilson (2002). World Heritage Listing of Australian
Natural Sites: Tourism Stimulus and its Economic Value. Economic Analysis and
Policy 32: 27-49.
Towse, Ruth (1997). Cultural Economics: the Arts, Heritage and the Media
Industries. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Towse, Ruth (ed.) (2003). A Handbook of Cultural Economics. Cheltenham, UK, and
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 255-262.
UNESCO (2005). World Heritage Information Kit. UNESCO World Heritage Centre,
Paris.23
Van der Aa, Bart J.M. (2005). Preserving the heritage of humanity? Obtaining world
heritage status and the impacts of listing. Doctoral thesis, Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research.CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2681 Marcelo Resende, Capital Structure and Regulation in U.S. Local Telephony: An 
Exploratory Econometric Study; June 2009 
 
2682 Marc Gronwald and Janina Ketterer, Evaluating Emission Trading as a Policy Tool – 
Evidence from Conditional Jump Models, June 2009 
 
2683 Stephan O. Hornig, Horst Rottmann and Rüdiger Wapler, Information Asymmetry, 
Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans, June 2009 
 
2684 Benoit Dostie and Rajshri Jayaraman, The Effect of Adversity on Process Innovations 
and Managerial Incentives, June 2009 
 
2685 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg and Hannes Winner, Incorporation and Taxation: 
Theory and Firm-level Evidence, June 2009 
 
2686 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis, Timing of Technology Adoption and 
Product Market Competition, June 2009 
 
2687 Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong and Jérémie Lefebvre, An Empirical Analysis of Legal 
Insider Trading in the Netherlands, June 2009 
 
2688 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman M. Sheremeta, An Experimental 
Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, June 2009 
 
2689 Alexander Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Weak and Strong Cross 
Section Dependence and Estimation of Large Panels, June 2009 
 
2690 Mohamed El Hedi Arouri and Christophe Rault, On the Influence of Oil Prices on Stock 
Markets: Evidence from Panel Analysis in GCC Countries, June 2009 
 
2691 Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Political Stability and Fiscal Policy – Time 
Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849, June 2009 
 
2692 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual 
Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth, June 2009 
 
2693 Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann, Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of 
Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000, June 2009 
 
2694 Kirsten Wandschneider and Nikolaus Wolf, Shooting on a Moving Target: Explaining 
European Bank Rates during the Interwar Period, June 2009 
 
2695 J. Atsu Amegashie, Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, June 2009 
  
2696 Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, War and Relatedness, June 2009 
 
2697 Steven Brakman, Charles van Marrewijk and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market 
Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market – the Importance of Capacity 
Constraints and Efficiency Differences, July 2009 
 
2698 Huifang Tian, John Whalley and Yuezhou Cai, Trade Sanctions, Financial Transfers 
and BRIC’s Participation in Global Climate Change Negotiations, July 2009 
 
2699 Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer, Government Decentralization as a Disincentive 
for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis, July 2009 
 
2700 Balázs Égert, Tomasz Koźluk and Douglas Sutherland, Infrastructure and Growth: 
Empirical Evidence, July 2009 
 
2701 Felix Bierbrauer, Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large 
Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty, July 2009 
 
2702 Marc Gronwald, Investigating the U.S. Oil-Macroeconomy Nexus using Rolling 
Impulse Responses, July 2009 
 
2703 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Government Deficits in the European Union: An Analysis 
of Entry and Exit Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2704 Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, July 
2009 
 
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009 
 
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
  
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
 
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
 
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009 
 
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
  
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
 
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 